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I. INTRODUCTION
It has always been the law of trespass mesne profits to an oil and gas
estate that a trespasser is liable for the value of the oil and gas that it
has produced from the estate to which it trespasses.1  That value is
determined after ascertaining whether the trespasser held an honest
belief that he or she had the right to produce oil or gas from the estate
upon which it trespassed.2  In those cases, the trespasser is said to
have trespassed in good faith.3  Conversely, the trespasser acts in bad
faith when it knowingly produces oil and gas without the right to do
so.4 The rule is couched subjectively from the perspective of the tres-
passer and not from the view of a reasonable person in the same posi-
tion as the trespasser.5
* The authors would like to thank Michelle A. Sottiaux, Esq., for her research
and contributions to this article.
1. See Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915); United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S.
440 (1947); Loeb v. Conley, 169 S.W. 575 (Ky. 1914); Barnes v. Winona Oil Co., 200 P.
985 (Okla. 1921).
2. United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. at 458.
3. Id.
4. Rudy v. Ellis, 236 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1951).
5. See id.; Sapulpa Petroleum Co. v. McCray, 277 P. 589, 590 (Okla. 1929);
Barnes v. Winona Oil Co., 200 P. 985 (Okla. 1921); Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear, 84 S.W.2d
452, 457 (Tex. 1935); Alaska Placer v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 58  (Alaska 1976); United
States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. at 440.
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The majority of oil and gas producing jurisdictions announce that
they apply a subjective standard.6  However, while those jurisdictions
recite the same rule, they do not apply it in the same fashion.7  In-
stead, an objective test has crept into the reasoning of the courts in
some jurisdictions.8  Rather than determining the trespasser’s subjec-
tive belief according to the facts, those courts treat certain facts as
dispositive of the question of good or bad faith despite, and in some
cases in spite of, evidence of an honest but mistaken belief of the tres-
passer’s right to produce.9
Those jurisdictions that inject objective criteria to a patently subjec-
tive test do not properly apply the rule.  The standard has always
looked to the subjective belief of the trespasser and cloaked him with
the status of good faith, provided his belief was honest, and regardless
of outside factors that would cause a reasonable person to believe dif-
ferently.10  This Article calls the courts that adopt objective criteria to
abandon their precedent and once more apply the well-reasoned sub-
jective test for determining a trespasser’s good or bad faith.
Section II of this Article states a brief history of the rule and dem-
onstrates some of the variations that have evolved in different juris-
dictions.  Section III analyzes jurisdictions that do not follow the
traditional pronouncement and application of the rule.  The scope of
this Article is limited only to the law of trespass as it pertains to oil
and gas and does not discuss different approaches to calculating dam-
ages, such as royalty or value in place distinctions, once a finding of
good faith is made.  The Article does not analyze cases involving resti-
tution or unjust enrichment by a trespasser for valuable improvements
made to real property.  Section IV is the conclusion and a call to
courts to adopt the traditional approach as applied by Oklahoma,
Kentucky, and Pennsylvania.
II. HISTORY OF THE RULE
A. The Traditional Rule
Kentucky, Oklahoma, Texas, Alaska, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming
follow the traditional rule that a trespasser may deduct his reasonable
costs of development if he held a subjective belief that he had the
6. See Rudy, 236 S.W.2d 466; Sapulpa, 277 P. at 590 (Okla. 1929); Barnes, 200 P.
at 985; Gulf Prod. Co., 84 S.W.2d at 457; Alaska Placer, 553 P.2d at 54; United States
v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440 (1947); Crawford, 57 A. at 47.
7. See Dolch v. Ramsey, 134 P.2d 19, 22 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943) (applying a
prudent person standard); Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co., 100 S.E.
296 (W. Va. 1919).
8. See Dolch, 134 P.2d at 19; Pentress Gas Co., 100 S.E. at  296.
9. See Hous. Prod. Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm’n App.
1933) (finding the trespasser acted in bad faith where they entered the land during the
pendency of litigation).
10. Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1039–41 (Ky. 1934).
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right to produce the oil and gas.11  The Kentucky Court of Appeals
recited the rule as follows:
The test to determine whether one was a wilful [sic] or an innocent
trespasser is, not his violation of the law in the light of the maxim
that every man knows the law, but his honest belief and his actual
intention at the time he committed the trespass.12
Rudy v. Ellis involved a lease that was invalid because a court-ap-
pointed trustee for contingent future interest-holders had not exe-
cuted it.13  After the execution of the lease and drilling of wells, a
trustee was appointed.14  But the court refused to confirm the lease,
and a new lease was executed to a different lessee.15  The court held
that constructive notice was insufficient and that actual notice was re-
quired for a willful trespass.16  The court concluded that the operator
was an innocent trespasser entitled to deduct their costs.17 The Ken-
tucky court’s test emphasizes what fundamentally distinguishes this
test from a negligence-derived “prudent operator” or “reasonable op-
erator” standard:  The trespasser’s internal state of mind, not an ob-
jective test of what the operator “should have” done.
There is a decision from the Kentucky Court of Appeals that ap-
pears to modify the traditional rule.  However, upon a closer read of
the case, it is clear that the court there, while reciting the rule differ-
ently, nonetheless applied the traditional rule.  In Loeb v. Conley, the
court considered a dispute between two lessees from the same les-
sor.18  The first lease purported to convey forty acres to Conley.19  The
second lease purported to convey twelve acres to Loeb.20  As is com-
mon, the land in the leases was only described by adjoinders and the
eastern adjoinder and western adjoinder, were incorrectly identified.21
The court nonetheless concluded that the description was sufficient to
put Loeb on notice that his tract was subject to the Conley lease.22
The court applied the following test to determine whether Loeb
could receive credit for the cost of drilled wells: “Whether they hon-
estly believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that they had the
11. See supra, note 7 and accompanying text.
12. Rudy, 236 S.W.2d at 468.
13. Id. at 466.
14. Id. at 467.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 468 (“It is suggested in appellants’ brief that appellees should have ex-
amined the title and should have known the law, and that the attorney who advised
the appointment of a guardian should have known the law.  But in this state we have
held that the rule of actual, not constructive, notice applies.  A wilful trespasser is one
who knows he is wrong; an innocent trespasser is one who believes he is right.”).
17. Id. at 469.
18. Loeb v. Conley, 169 S.W. 575, 576–77 (Ky. 1914).
19. Id. at 576.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 576–77.
22. Id. at 578.
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right, by virtue of their lease, to develop the property by boring these
wells.”23  This test arguably deviates from the traditional rule in incor-
porating the objective term “reasonable” to the rule.  However, from
that case it was clear that an operator’s reasonable grounds to believe
their title is good is a relevant factor judging whether the operator
honestly believed in the strength of their title.  As will be discussed
later, because the relevance of the basis for the operator’s belief in his
title in determining his subjective belief, some courts have moved
away from the classic test over time, focusing more on the objective
reasonableness of the operator’s conduct and ignoring the operator’s
subjective beliefs.  In Loeb, the court expressly did not consider
whether constructive notice of the Conley lease impacted the good
faith of Loeb’s operations.24  However, the court held that because
Loeb was made aware of the prior lease before development and had
the opportunity to get his money back, Loeb’s development was not in
good faith.25
In Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, the Kentucky Court of Appeals clari-
fied Loeb and provided some additional insight in how to determine
when a trespasser is innocent or willful.26  The operator in Swiss Oil
Corp. had color of title under a lease that was subsequently deter-
mined to be a top lease.27  The operator had secured a legal opinion
that the prior lease had forfeited for failure to develop.28  After nu-
23. Id. at 581.
24. Id. (“In disposing of this question we will leave entirely out of view the con-
structive notice furnished to the Loebs by the recorded lease of Conley, and further
assume that when they took their lease from Sebastian they, in good faith, believed
that Sebastian had the right to make the lease, thus narrowing the question down to
the effect of the actual notice of Conley’s superior title before the expenditure of
money in making the improvements.”).
25. Id. (“Fortunately there is little material dispute about the facts as to actual
notice.  After the Loebs had secured the lease from Sebastian, but before they had
expended any money in improvements or in boring these wells, they not only had
actual notice of the assertion of Conley’s claim, but actual notice of the existence of
Conley’s lease, and there had been tendered back to them by Sebastian the money
they paid to him for the lease.  After receiving this actual notice and rejecting this
tender, they proceeded to commence operations, but had only expended a few dollars
before Conley brought this suit against them, in which he prayed that their lease be
canceled, and that they be enjoined from entering upon the land or operating thereon
for oil or gas or from interfering with him in any way in the development of the land.
Therefore we may safely say from the record that all of the improvements for which
the Loebs now seek compensation were made, not only after they had actual notice,
by the service of process of this suit, but actual notice of the existence of Conley’s
lease, and this lease, as we have said, furnished to them notice of the prior and supe-
rior claim and title of Conley to this land.  Under these circumstances we think that
the Loebs did not make these improvements in the good-faith belief that they had the
right to make them, and so are not entitled to compensation.”).
26. Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (Ky. 1934).
27. Id. at 1039.
28. Id. at 1039–40.
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merous decisions and appeals, the court ultimately ruled that the prior
lease was held by production.29
The court first noted that the burden of proof is on the trespasser
and that although the test is subjective, mere testimony by an operator
that he or she had a good faith belief in the right to produce is insuffi-
cient.30  The court then explained how circumstances were relevant to
the determination of the operator’s state of mind:
The test to be applied is that of intent, but, being a state of mind, it
can seldom be proved by direct evidence. The conditions and be-
havior are usually such that the court can determine whether the
trespass was perpetrated in a spirit of wrongdoing, with a knowl-
edge that it was wrong, or whether it was done under a bona fide
mistake, as where the circumstances were calculated to induce or
justify the reasonably prudent man, acting with a proper sense of
the rights of others, to go in and to continue along the way. And, in
judging the trespasser’s acts, regard must be had for conditions as
they then appeared rather than as disclosed in the light cast back-
wards by the future. In a word, they are to be judged prospectively,
not retrospectively. So, as stated in Loeb v. Conley whether a tres-
passer is to be so regarded depends upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction, and it is from those facts and
circumstances that the court will determine whether he was acting
in good faith and under an honest conviction that he was right in his
assumption.31
This passage clarifies that the basis for an operator’s belief in his or
her title is relevant, not because the operator has to conform to a rea-
sonable operator standard, but because the strength of the basis di-
rectly supports a determination that the operator indeed had an
honest belief in the strength of the title.
While not applying state law and instead relying on federal princi-
ples of equity, the United States Supreme Court applied the tradi-
tional rule in Guffey v. Smith.  There, the Court provided a good
example of an application of the subjective test:
As respects the cost incurred prior to August 1, 1907, we think the
objection is well taken, for up to that time Solley and his associates
were in actual ignorance of the earlier lease, and were proceeding in
the honest belief that the later lease, assigned to them by Willett,
was the only one upon the premises. They paid a substantial sum for
it, were let into possession by the lessor, and were not conscious
that they were invading the rights of others. True, the prior lease
had been properly recorded, but as they consulted an abstracter
29. Id. at 1039–41.
30. Id. at 1041 (“To be sure, the mere testimony of the person affected that he
acted in good faith and honestly believed he was right in the position he assumed is
not conclusive or, indeed, sufficient of itself to entitle him to the advantage of one
occupying the place of innocence or good faith.”).
31. Id. (citations omitted).
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before consummating the transaction with Willett, and were advised
that the title was clear, the constructive notice resulting from the
recording of the prior lease was not inconsistent with an honest,
though mistaken, belief on their part that they had acquired a per-
fect right to take and dispose of the oil. But the expenses incurred
after August 1, 1907, are upon a different footing. On that date Sol-
ley and his associates were actually and fully informed of the prior
lease and of the complainants’ purpose to insist upon the rights con-
ferred by it and to obtain redress for the invasion of those rights, so
what was done thereafter cannot be regarded as anything less than a
wilful taking and appropriation of the oil which was subject to the
complainants’ superior right.32
Guffey notes that constructive notice by itself is not sufficient to
make the trespasser willful.33  Instead, it is actual notice of the defect
in their title that makes a person a bad-faith trespasser.
The Supreme Court of Oklahmoa strictly applied the traditional
rule in Sapulpa Petroleum Co. v. McCray to determine good or bad
faith.34  There, the trespasser, McCray, entered and developed prop-
erty under a contract purporting that the grantors would subsequently
convey leasehold rights to McCray.35  Unknown to McCray, the grant-
ors never completed the transactions necessary to vest the leases in
McCray.36  Because those transactions were never completed, McCray
was trespassing.37  Once he had notice of the issue, McCray sought
specific performance of the defective leasehold conveyances.38  The
trial court denied specific performance, leaving McCray without a col-
orable right to develop the property.39
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the trial court’s finding
of good faith, stating: “Good faith consists of an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
through forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence of
all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction
unconscientious.”40  The Court explained that color of title sufficiently
establishes good faith, and that “[t]he fact that a purchaser may err in
judgment is not enough to impeach his good faith, but it exists when
the purchase is made with an honest purpose, though the real estate is
not acquired.”41  Finding good faith, the Court allowed McCray to de-
32. Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 118–19 (1915).
33. Id.
34. See Sapulpa Petroleum Co. v. McCray, 277 P. 589, 590 (Okla. 1929); Barnes v.
Winona Oil Co., 200 P. 985 (Okla. 1921).





40. Id. at 590–91 (holding the trial court’s finding of good faith as a fact “is not
clearly against the weight of evidence”).
41. Id. at 590 (citing Winters v. Haines, 84 Ill. 585 (1877)).
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duct the reasonable costs of production from the total damages.42
This holding reflects a straightforward application of the subjective
rule.
The Supreme Court of Texas generally applies the traditional rule,
as announced in Gulf Production Co. v. Spear.43  While the Court in
Spear did not “undertake to prescribe a test for the determination of
. . . good faith,”44 it stated the general rule that, “[T]o act in good faith
in developing a tract of land for oil or gas one must have both an
honest and a reasonable belief in the superiority of his title.”45  Lower
courts adopted the “honest and reasonable” language, keeping the de-
termination within the province of the trier of fact.46  Texas courts
continue to mix an objective component into the subjective test.47
Pennsylvania also applies the traditional rule.  In Crawford v. Forest
Oil Co., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the rule where
the operator made an error of law that rendered his title defective.48
The subject property had been devised to the lessor “and to his chil-
dren.”49  The operator took a lease from the lessor alone, and contin-
ued producing from the leased premises after the lessor’s death,
ignorant of the fact that, under Pennsylvania law, the devise at issue
vested only a life estate in the lessor with a remainder in his
children.50
42. Id. at 590–91 (“A person who in good faith enters into peaceable possession of
land upon which he owns an oil and gas lease and produces oil and gas therefrom, and
thereafter said lease is declared void and invalid, the measure of damages to the land-
lord in an action for an accounting for the oil and gas produced from the said prem-
ises by the lessee is the value of the oil at the surface or in the pipeline or tanks,
wherever the same may be, less the reasonable cost of producing the same.”) (quoting
Barnes v. Winona Oil Co., 200 P. 985, 985 (1921); citing United States v. Gentry, 119
F. 70 (8th Cir. 1902); United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 117 F. 481 (8th Cir.
1902) (concerning action on advice of reputable counsel)).
43. Compare Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear, 84 S.W.2d 452, 457 (Tex. 1935) (noting that
“[for a trespasser] to act in good faith in developing a tract of land for oil or gas one
must have both an honest and a reasonable belief in the superiority of his title”) with
Hous. Prod. Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933) (finding
the trespasser acted in bad faith where they entered on the land during the pendency
of litigation).
44. Gulf Prod. Co., 84 S.W.2d at 457 (noting the question of good faith is an issue
of fact for the trier of fact) (citing Holstein v. Adams, 10 S.W. 560 (Tex. 1889); Pome-
roy v. Pearce, 2 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928); see also Will Crews Morris,
Comment, Oil and Gas—Right of Trespasser to Compensate for Improvements—What
Constitutes “Good Faith”, 12 TEX. L. REV. 210, 218 (1934)).
45. Gulf Prod. Co., 84 S.W.2d at 457.  The Court then notes a number of Texas
cases and other authorities stating the general rule. Id. (citations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 130 S.W.2d 365, 376 (Tex. Civ.
App.—El Paso 1939), mod. on other grounds 152 S.W.2d 711 (1941) (stating “[g]ood
faith . . . depends upon the possessor who so develops having an honest and reasona-
ble belief in the superiority of his title”) (citing Gulf Prod. Co., 84 S.W.2d at 457).
47. See infra notes 135–162 and accompanying text.
48. Crawford v. Forest Oil Co., 57 A. 47 (Pa. 1904).
49. Id. at 53.
50. Id. at  53–54.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the superior court on
damages, which had held that the trespasser was an innocent tres-
passer who was entitled to deduct his costs of production:
What is the true measure of damages in this case? The evidence
shows that the defendant company took the oil under a claim of
right which turned wholly on a question of law. In law it had no
claim, but it thought the law gave it a claim. It was honestly mis-
taken when it made the entry, and therefore we are of opinion, as
we have already indicated, that the net value of the oil in the pipe
lines is the true measure of damages for the oil taken, and in arriv-
ing at that sum we have taken what the oil sold for in the market,
and from this deducted the cost of production.51
The threshold issue of when a trespasser has actual notice of the com-
peting claim can be a very difficult determination to make.  In Rudy,
the court clearly thought the fact that the defect in the lease was not
court-approved did not render the trespass willful.52  Similarly, in Guf-
fey the Supreme Court thought that the failure of the operator’s ab-
stractor to find the prior lease did not render the trespass willful.53  In
Crawford, the court decided that the trespass was not willful because
their claim turned wholly on a question of law (which the court implic-
itly concluded was not wholly unreasonable).54  This raises the ques-
tion of what relevance the basis for the operator’s belief in his or her
right to operate has to the subjective test.
Some states continue to apply the traditional rule with no varia-
tion,55 some states that applied that rule early in their case law later
include objective “reasonable” wording, while leaving the application
unchanged.56  Oklahoma is one example.  While first employing the
traditional rule,57 the Oklahoma Supreme Court parted with a
straightforward wording of that rule, adding “reasonable” language.58
In Miller v. Tidal Oil Co., the Court added the word “reasonable”
to the definition of good faith previously announced in Sapulpa Petro-
leum and Barnes.59  In Miller, Tidal Oil Co. (Tidal) developed a tract
of land with the belief that it had good title to the tract it developed.60
51. Id. at 52.
52. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
55. Crawford, 57 A. at 47. See also Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915); Pitts-
burgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co., 100 S.E. 296 (W. Va. 1919); Barnes v.
Winona Oil Co., 200 P. 985 (Okla. 1921); Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037
(Ky. 1934).
56. Compare Barnes, 200 P. 985 (applying a subjective intent test to determine
good faith), with Miller v. Tidal Oil Co., 17 P.2d 967, 970 (Okla. 1932) (adding a
“reasonableness” component to the definition of good faith).
57. See Barnes, 200 P. at 285.
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of Sapulpa and Barnes, see Miller, 17 P.2d at 967.
60. Miller, 17 P.2d at 967–68.
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After an adverse ruling and subsequent appeals, the court held that
Tidal did not have good title, and it was a trespasser.61  The only issue
left to determine was the amount of damages Tidal owed for trespass-
ing—a question that required a finding of whether Tidal trespassed in
good or bad faith.62
Beginning its analysis of the character of Tidal’s trespass, the Court
noted that good faith “exists when the purchase is made with an hon-
est purpose,” and continued along that line stating good faith “is said
to be the opposite of fraud.”63  However, the Court then slightly mod-
ified the language of the traditional rule, holding: “Good faith, means
that the taking is without culpable negligence or a willful disregard of
the rights of others and in the honest and reasonable belief that it was
rightful.”64  For the first time in Oklahoma, the Court seemingly in-
serted objective components to the test for determing whether good
or bad faith by adding the terms “negligence” and “reasonable.”65
The Court went on to announce that good faith exists where a legal
wrongdoer acted in “honest belief that his conduct was lawful,”66 mix-
ing the objective “reasonable” standard with the subjective “honest
belief.”67  While the Court modified the wording of the traditional
rule to include objective criteria, it did not discuss how to apply those
objective criteria, nor did it define the term “culpable negligence.”  In
fact, the analysis of the trespasser’s good faith did not incorporate an
objective inquiry into the reasonableness of the trespasser’s belief in
their right to enter the property.68  To date, neither Kentucky nor
Oklahoma has applied an objective inquiry.
Following Miller, a few other jurisdictions adopted the mixed sub-
jective–objective wording of the traditional rule for determining
whether a trespass occurred with good or bad faith.69
61. Id. at 968–69.
62. Id. at 970 (stating “[t]he rule is well established in this state that a person who
in good faith enters into peaceable possession of land upon which he owns an oil and
gas lease and produces oil and gas therefrom and the lease is thereafter declared void
is entitled to the reasonable cost of producing the oil and gas in an action for an
accounting by the landlord”) (citing Barnes, 200 P. at 285; Minshall v. Berryhill, 205 P.
932 (Okla. 1921); Woodworth v. Franklin, 204 P. 452, 453 (Okla. 1921)).
63. Miller, 17 P.2d at 970; Sapulpa Petroleum Co. v. McCray, 277 P. 589, 590
(Okla. 1929).
64. Miller, 17 P.2d at 970 (emphasis added).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (defining the standard of
conduct of a “reasonable man”).
66. Miller, 17 P.2d at 970.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See generally United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 458 (1947) (applying
Wyoming law, noting that the determination of good faith was not before the Court,
but that good faith is “something more than the trespasser’s assertion of a colorable
claim to the converted minerals”); Hammond v. Ingram Ind., Inc., 716 F.2d 365, 371
(6th Cir. 1983) (applying Kentucky law) (noting that the law is “well-settled that an
intentional trespasser is one who trespasses knowing he is wrong, while an innocent
trespasser believes he is right”) (citing Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Ky.
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The Alaska Supreme Court also adopted Miller’s pronouncement,
while signaling to the per se standard applied in Houston Production
Co. v. Mecom, discussed below.70  In Alaska Placer, the Lees tres-
passed on Alaska Placer Co.’s property and continued to extract min-
erals after litigation commenced between the parties.71  The trial court
found the Lees did not trespass in bad faith.72  Upholding the trial
court’s characterization of the trespass,73 the Court quoted Miller,
stating that good faith is an “honest and reasonable belief” that the
taking is rightful.74  The Court also cited Sapulpa Petroleum’s pro-
nouncement that good faith is the “honest intention not to take un-
conscientious advantage of another.”75
The Court did not agree with the argument that the Lees acted in
bad faith simply because they possessed and mined the property after
the commencement of litigation.76  The Court distinguished the facts
from those in Mecom explaining the Lees were in possession and min-
ing prior to the commencement of litigation.77  The decision appears
to apply an objective component to the traditional rule, but fails to
articulate how and when it would apply.78
These decisions continue to prove the validity of the traditional rule
that is still applied by a majority of jurisdictions.  A minority of courts
break from the traditional application by adding an objective compo-
nent to the subjective test.
III. NON-TRADITIONAL RULE STATES
A minority of jurisdictions, while citing the traditional rule, none-
theless take a radically different approach to classifying one as a good-
or bad-faith trespasser.  While not uniform in their approach, the
1965); Rudy v. Ellis, 236 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1952)); Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553
P.2d 54, 58 (Alaska 1976) (defining good faith as an “honest and reasonable belief”
that the taking is rightful) (citing Miller, 17 P.2d at 967); Dethoff v. Zeigler Coal Co.,
386 N.E.2d 1373, 1385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 412 N.E.2d 526 (Ill.
1980).
70. Alaska Placer, 553 P.2d at 58.  Hous. Prod. Co. v. Mecom, 62 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.
Comm’n App. 1933) is discussed infra notes 139–163 and accompanying text.
71. Alaska Placer, 553 P.2d at 56.
72. Id. at 54–58.
73. Id. at 58 (citing Bostic v. Whited, 93 S.E.2d 334, 335 (Va. 1956) (noting that
factors such as reliance on counsel have been held sufficient to find good faith) (citing
Elk Horn Coal Co. v. Anderson Coal Co., 223 F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.D. Ky. 1963);
Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1041–42 (1934)).
74. Id. at 58 (citing Miller v. Tidal Oil Co., 17 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1932)).
75. Id. The Court in Alaska Placer defines “good faith” in a mineral-trespass claim
as an “honest and reasonable belief that the taking is rightful,” but fails to further
elucidate application of the “reasonableness” standard, noting good faith is an “hon-
est intention not to take unconscientious advantage of another.” (internal quotations
omitted).
76. Id. at 60–61.
77. Alaska Placer, 553 P.2d at 60 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 58 (citing Miller v. Tidal Oil Co., 17 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1932)).
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courts of those states do not inquire into the trespasser’s subjective
intent.  In fact, in those states, the trespasser’s honest mistake as to
whether he or she holds good title is irrelevant.  What is relevant is
whether the behavior was objectively reasonable.  The states that fol-
low the objective rule are West Virginia, California, and, under limited
circumstances, Texas.79
West Virginia first adopted the objective rule in Pittsburgh & West
Virginia Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co.80  The plaintiffs in Pittsburgh
were the successors in interest to two oil and gas leases that covered
two separate parcels of property.81  The leases were “no term” leases,
meaning that the lessee must drill a well or pay a set price, in this case
quarterly, to its lessor in order to hold the lease.82  For several years,
the lessee paid the quarterly price to the lessor to hold the leases.83
At the conclusion of one of the quarterly periods, the lessor notified
the lessee that the leases were terminated and refused tender of the
next quarterly lease payments.84  The lessor then executed new leases
to the same parcels.85
The new lessees were the defendants in Pittsburgh.86  The defend-
ants were aware of the prior leases taken by the plaintiff.87  The de-
fendants filed a lawsuit in equity that requested that the court enjoin
the plaintiff’s conduct on the leases because the same had termi-
nated.88  The defendants then drilled producing wells upon the prop-
erty.89  The West Virginia Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s
decision, holding that the plaintiff’s leases had not terminated.90  Sub-
sequently, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in equity demanding the trial
court enjoin the defendants from further operations.91  The defend-
ants argued that they were good-faith trespassers in drilling the wells
and requested an offset for the costs to drill and operate the wells that
had been trespassed.92  The West Virginia Supreme Court described
the issue as whether the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s claim
79. For reasons discussed infra, it appears California courts have adopted the non-
subjective rule; however, there is some ambiguity in the case law. See Dolch v. Ram-
sey, 134 P.2d 19 (Cal. App. 1943) (applying a prudent person standard). But see Que-
tin v. Caubu, 137 P.2d 880, 884 (Cal. App. 1943) (citing Dolch and applying an
“honest mistake” standard).









88. Id. at 297.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 300.
91. Id. at 297.
92. Id.
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of title and the facts upon which the plaintiff supported that claim
foreclosed them from the status of a good-faith trespasser.93  In other
words, can an honest mistake to the law, as opposed to the facts, leave
one a good-faith trespasser?94
The Court in Pittsburgh cited to the traditional rule noting that:
[W]here the trespass is willful, the measure of damages is the value
of the property at the time and place of demand, without deduction
for labor and expense; but where such trespass is not willful, but is
the result of a mistake of fact, the measure of plaintiff’s damages is
the value of the article after its severance, less the proper expense of
such severance.95
While noting the traditional rule, the court nonetheless held that a
party can never be a good-faith trespasser as a matter of law if the
only basis for their trespass is a mistake of law.96  The court cited
holdings from earlier cases in which it had denied a trespasser the
right to offset the value of improvements made to the real estate upon
which it trespassed.97
The court in Pittsburgh did not employ the traditional rule.  It was
clear from the case that the defendants held an honest, yet mistaken,
belief that they had legal title to the oil and gas estate.98  The Court in
Pittsburgh did not dispute the trespasser’s honest belief of good title.
Instead, the Court created a bright-line rule that an operator is a bad-
faith trespasser when its mistake goes to the law and not to the facts.99
Pittsburgh has been criticized by commentators.100  It is not difficult to
see why, as the test essentially leaves one strictly liable as a bad-faith
93. Id.
94. See generally id.  From the facts, it appears that the Court did not question that
the defendant’s mistake as to the law was honest. Id.  In those states that adopt the
subjective rule, a mistake as to only the law is still a sufficient basis to hold one a good
faith trespasser. See Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1042 (Ky. 1934) (stat-
ing “the test is not the trespasser’s violation of the law in the light of the maxim that
every man knows the law, but is his sincerity and his actual intention at the time”).
95. Pittsburgh, 100 S.E. at 298.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 297 (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Deepwater Ry. Co., 50 S.E.
890 (W. Va. 1905); Snider v. Snider, 3 W. Va. 200 (1869); Dawson v. Grow, 1 S.E. 564
(W. Va. 1887); Hall v. Hall, 5 S.E. 260 (W. Va. 1888)).
98. Pittsburgh, 100 S.E. at 298.
99. Id.
100. See 1 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 2:7 (3d ed. 2004) (noting
that Pittsburgh departs from the subjective rule that finds bad faith from “whether the
trespasser had the actual intention of violating the rights of another or the honest
belief of exercising his or her own privileges at the time of the trespass.”); id. § 2:4
(criticizing the rule and noting its departure from the subjective rule); Morris, supra
note 44, at 218 (noting criticism); P. E. D., Oil and Gas—Improvements by Good
Faith Trespasser—Mistake of Law, 6 TEX. L. REV. 547, 548 (1928) (noting departure
from the rule and criticism of the same).
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trespasser.  Presumably, the only type of trespass that could conceiva-
bly meet its good-faith test would be a pure mistake of fact.101
It is not entirely clear whether California rejects the traditional rule.
While California recognized the rule early in its statehood,102 a series
of holdings from the state’s intermediate courts  inconsistently applied
the rule and at times appear to reject it directly.103  One such case was
Dolch v. Ramsey.104  In Dolch, a court of appeals departed from the
subjective rule.105  The defendant in Dolch removed ore from prop-
erty he did not own.106  The trial court held that the removal of ore
was in good faith and the result of “inadvertence and an honest mis-
take and without any knowledge of the ownership of plaintiff.”107  The
defendant believed that the plaintiff had abandoned the mine.108
Prior to the defendant’s trespass, the plaintiff carved a 154-foot tunnel
into the mountain through which he removed and sold the mineral.109
The plaintiff later left the mine, which was permissible under mining
moratorium acts passed by Congress.110  From these facts, it was not
disputed that title to the mineral claim belonged to the plaintiff.111
The defendant supported his belief that the mine was abandoned from
the condition in which he found the property.112  Specifically, the trial
court found that the terrain was covered by bushes and trees.113 The
defendant did testify, however, that from the property he could see at
least two “corner stakes,” a requirement of a claim to a mineral
interest.114
The defendant produced a picture taken from a position where one
of the corner stakes would be clearly visible.115  The court states, “the
conclusion is inescapable that had [the defendant looked from that
position] towards this corner stake he must have seen it.”116  Also, it is
101. See Taylor v. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., 2 S.W.2d 288, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Beaumont 1928, writ dism’d w.o.j.). But see Rieckhoff v. Consol. Gas Co., 217 P.2d
1076, 1080 (Mont. 1950) (citing Pittsburgh in dicta and agreeing with its holding as
applied to the facts of that case).
102. See, e.g., Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306, 309 (1863); Empire Gravel Mining Co.
v. Bonanza Gravel Mining Co., 7 P. 810, 812 (Cal. 1885).
103. Maye, 23 Cal. at 310–13, (recognizing that in earlier cases the form of the ac-
tion—trover, trespass quer qausi figet, or trespass mesne profits—governed the mea-
sure of a damages a plaintiff was owed).
104. Dolch v. Ramsey, 134 P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943) (Dolch involved a mineral
interest, ore, and not oil and gas).
105. Id. at 22.
106. Id. at 21.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 20.
110. Id. at 22.
111. Id. at 19–20.
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undisputed that had defendant followed the law in locating his min-
eral claim on what he believed was the plaintiff’s abandoned mineral
claim, he would have discovered additional evidence of the plaintiff’s
claim.117
From these facts, the appellate court concluded that the trial court
erred in finding the defendant a good-faith trespasser.118  First, as with
Pittsburgh, the court cited the subjective rule:
The measure of damages in an action for trespass on a mining claim,
in the absence of oppression, fraud or malice, is the amount which
will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused by the
trespass. Accordingly, where one invades another’s mine as the re-
sult of inadvertence or an honest mistake, the measure of damages
therefor is the value of mineral extracted, less the cost of mining
and milling. . . . Where the trespass is intentionally committed, with
knowledge of the owner’s rights, the measure of damages is the
value of the mineral after reduction, without deducting the expenses
of mining and milling.119
Although the court cited the subjective rule, it did not apply it sub-
jectively.  Instead, it looked at the evidence, which included the testi-
mony from the defendant about his intentions in trespassing, and
concluded that the law must impute bad faith.120 In support, the court
wrote:
A person may not have actual knowledge of certain facts, but if he
has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonably prudent per-
son of ordinary intelligence to make inquiry, the law will impute
knowledge of those facts which may be easily ascertained by reason-
able inquiry. When the law imputes knowledge, it has the same legal
effect as though there was actual knowledge.121
From that language, it is unmistakable that the court applied a rule at
odds with the traditional rule.  The court did not subjectively apply
the rule it recited, but instead relied upon objective criteria—“a rea-
sonably prudent person”—to determine if the defendant was a good-
faith trespasser.  The court downplayed, even disregarded, the actual
state of mind of the defendant and instead relied upon what it be-
lieved the defendant should know.122  The court’s language suggests
that an honest belief of good title—the traditional rule—will not sup-
port a status of good faith if that honest belief was unreasonably held
as judged from the perspective of a reasonably prudent man.
117. Id. at 21.
118. Id. at 23.
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 21–23.
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At least one other court cited Dolch with approval.123  Subsequent
to Dolch, other California Courts of Appeal reached seemingly con-
flicting holdings.124  In Ehrhart v. Bowling, the court of appeals cited
Pittsburgh in dicta in upholding a jury’s finding of bad faith.125  Curi-
ously, the court held that the trial court did not err in its jury instruc-
tion on when a person trespasses in good or bad faith.126  That
instruction read:
[Y]ou are instructed that the measure of damages . . . shall be gov-
erned by the following rule: If you should find that the plaintiff. . .
was the owner of such mine, and that the same was invaded by the
defendants . . . as the result of an honest mistake and inadvertence,
the measure, of damages would be the value of the mineral ex-
tracted from the ore, less the cost of production, but if you should
find that such invasion, if any, was intentional and with knowledge
of plaintiff’s rights, then I instruct you that the measure of damages
would be the value of the mineral extracted from the ore, without
any deduction for expenses of mining, milling or production.127
The instruction recites the subjective rule.  The trial court did not
modify the rule to instruct the jury that the honest mistake of the de-
fendant is held to a reasonable-man standard, meaning that if that rea-
sonable man would have acted differently then the defendant
committed bad-faith trespass.  The court of appeals did not find the
instruction erroneous and held that the jury had sufficient evidence to
support a finding of bad faith.128  From that holding, the court noted
in dicta that the defendant’s belief alone is not sufficient to support a
finding of good faith.129  From that point, the court cited the Pitts-
burgh holding that a party is not a good-faith trespasser if they
“know[ ] all of the facts which constitute [their] claim, as well as the
claim of his adversary, which facts, when properly construed, give him
no title to the land.”130  As discussed above, Pittsburgh does not em-
ploy the subjective rule.  In Ehrhart, the court seemingly approved an
instruction that is in accord with the subjective rule, but cited with
approval, albeit in dicta, language at odds with that rule.131
123. Tejeda v. Taylor, No. B173254, 2005 WL 583334 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2005)
(citing Dolch for the prudent person standard).
124. See generally id.; Daly v. Smith, 33 Cal. Rptr. 920, 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)
(signaling to Dolch while applying a more subjective standard); Quetin v. Caubu, 137
P.2d 880, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943) (citing Dolch and applying an “honest mistake”
standard); Martinez v. De Los Rios, 331 P.2d 724, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (citing
Dolch and applying “good faith” standard).
125. Ehrhart v. Bowling, 97 P.2d 1010, 1013 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940).
126. Id. at 1014.
127. Id. at 1013.
128. Id. at 1013–14.
129. Id. at 1013.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1013–14.
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Finally, in Whittaker v. Otto, the court of appeals upheld a jury ver-
dict finding good faith despite evidence that the defendant had actual
awareness of the adverse claim of the plaintiff.132  Unlike in Dolch,
where the court found an abuse of discretion, the appellate court did
not find this verdict to be against the weight of the evidence even
though the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s adverse
claim.133  Instead, the court stressed that the issue of good or bad faith
is a jury question and that the jury could have decided that the defen-
dant’s reliance on the advice of counsel made them good-faith
trespassers.134
The holding in Whittaker appears inconsistent with the court’s prior
holding in Dolch.  In Dolch the court decided that the fact finder—the
trial court—abused its discretion in finding the defendant was a good-
faith trespasser.135  While the defendant in Dolch had not sought the
advice of counsel before deciding to trespass, the court stressed that it
was his failure to make inquires that made him a bad-faith trespasser.
Because there were facts that would have placed a reasonably prudent
man on notice, the defendant had constructive notice of the plaintiff’s
superior title.136
It is difficult to reconcile the disjunction between Dolch and Whitta-
ker.  In both cases the fact finder determined the status of the defen-
dant as one of good or bad faith, yet the court overturned the decision
in the former and not in the latter.  The only distinction between the
two cases is that in Whittaker, but not in Dolch, the defendant tres-
passed after obtaining advice of counsel.137
While Texas is a traditional rule state, as discussed above,138 it does
have one notable exception in which it applies the non-traditional
rule: A person is a bad-faith trespasser per se if they first trespass after
a lawsuit over their title is commenced.139  This is true even if the tres-
passer holds an honest and good-faith belief as to the superiority of
132. Whittaker v. Otto, 248 Cal. App. 2d 666, 669 (1967) (one of several defendants
to that lawsuit had actually checked record title and ascertained that title was not in
his lessor). But see Dolch v. Ramsey, 134 P.2d 19, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
133. Ehrhart, 97 P.2d at 1013.
134. Whittaker, 248 Cal. App. 2d at 676–77.
135. Dolch, 134 P.2d at 22.
136. Id.
137. Courts in other jurisdictions in which the subjective-rule is employed have
noted that advice of counsel is one strong factor a fact finder can rely upon to support
a conclusion that one trespassed in good faith.  Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 69 S.W.2d
1037, 1041–42 (Ky. 1934) (stating the trespasser’s acting “upon the advice of reputable
counsel” is a factor evidencing good faith.).  In other jurisdictions, advice of counsel is
viewed as conduct that leaves one a good-faith trespasser per se.  Alaska Placer Co. v.
Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 59 (Alaska 1976) (noting that “[r]eliance on the advice of a reputa-
ble counsel has been held to be a sufficient basis for a finding that a trespass was
made in good faith” (citations omitted)).
138. See supra Section II.A. (or footnotes 43–47 and accompanying text).
139. Hous. Prod. Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Comm’n App.
1933).
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their title.140  The seminal case that decided this point was Houston
Production Co. v. Mecom Oil Co.141
In Mecom, the defendant trespassed under color of title and for the
first time after a lawsuit was filed against it that alleged that its title
was defective.142  The defendant was held to be a trespasser as to the
plaintiff whose title was found superior.143  On the question of tres-
pass and the proper damages to award the plaintiff, the jury found
that the plaintiff trespassed in good faith and thus the defendant was
entitled to an offset for the costs to drill and operate the well.144  A
judgment was entered from those proceedings.145
The defendant in Mecom appealed the judgment against him, and
the court of appeals ruled in his favor.146  The Texas Supreme Court
then reversed the decisions of both courts and entered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff.147  The Court held that a person is a bad-faith
trespasser per se if they first trespass after the filing of a lawsuit over
their title.148  In support, the Court cited Pittsburgh and wrote:
We are inclined to adhere to the well-established rule that, where
one enters into possession of land and makes improvements thereon
with full knowledge of the pendency of an action to enforce an ad-
verse claim to the premises, he cannot be considered a trespasser in
good faith so as to entitle him to recover the cost of his
improvements.149
The Court also relied upon Texas case law in which the Texas Su-
preme Court ruled that a trespasser is not entitled to an offset for
improvements erected upon real property after a lawsuit over title
commences.150
Mecom was an action at law for trespass and not one at equity.  The
Court noted that it was disinclined to create an exception for oil and
gas trespassers based on a need to avoid drainage from adjoining
140. Id. at 76.
141. Id. at 75.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 76.
144. Id. at 75.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 77.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Henderson v. Ownby, 56 Tex. 647 (1882).  At least one commentator has criti-
cized the Texas Supreme Court’s reliance on Henderson.  Morris, supra note 44 at n.
19 (“[Henderson] involved the right of a tenant, who had erected a house on premises
which were in litigation under an agreement with the unsuccessful claimant of the
premises, to remove the house after title had been determined [sic].”).
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property.151  Curiously, the Court appeared ready to reach a different
result if the action was filed in equity.152
Mecom is not without its critics;153 some believe that the Court mis-
placed its reliance on both Texas and out-of-state case law.154  Specifi-
cally, one commentator noted that the Mecom Court erroneously
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Guffey v. Smith
in reaching its holding, noting that in Guffey the trespasser knew that
another had superior title.155  Equipped with that knowledge, the tres-
passer continued producing because he believed that the true owner
could not enforce its title in the property under Illinois law.156  The
federal court, bound by federal (and not state) principles of equity,
refused to deny the plaintiffs relief and found that the defendant’s
actual knowledge made them bad-faith trespassers.157
Moreover, critics believe that there is no practical reason for the
rule the Court crafted in Mecom.158 One commentator notes that
holding any single factor as dispositive ignores the central principle of
the subjective rule: whether the trespasser held an honest belief that
his title was superior.159  In fact, it may well be that a trespasser con-
tinues to hold an honest belief to the superiority of its title even after
a lawsuit over title is commenced.160
Withstanding the criticism, Mecom has never been overruled. Nev-
ertheless, without citing Mecom, the Texas Supreme Court in Brannon
v. Gulf States Energy Corp. held that a person was not a bad-faith
trespasser as a matter of law for drilling two wells with notice of an-
other’s claim to superior title.161  Dispositive to the court’s decision,
and perhaps the reason it did not cite Mecom, was the fact that the
trespass occurred before a lawsuit over title to the property at issue
151. Mecom, 62 S.W.2d at 77.  Other courts have crafted exceptions for oil and gas
trespassers who trespass under color of title in the form of an oil and gas lease.  Their
argument in support of the exception is that a lessee often must continue to produce
to avoid losing their lease and should not rely to their detriment on the adverse claim
of another.
152. Id. (noting a different result in equity because a “court of equity . . . has ample
authority to take such action as will prevent the property’s being drained of its oil and
gas pending the final adjudication of title.”).
153. Morris, supra note 44, at 221.
154. See supra note 149.  The Mecom Court also cited to the United States Supreme
Court decision Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915).  For a discussion on Guffey, see
notes 29–30 supra.
155. Morris, supra note 44, at 219.
156. Id. at n.45.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 220–21.
159. Id.
160. Id.; see also Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear, 84 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex. Comm’n App.
1935) (noting conflict in the reasoning of the court in Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear, and
Mecom).
161. Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Corp., 562 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. 1977).
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began.162  This was true even when a third well was drilled on the
property after the lawsuit was filed.163
In Whelan v. Killingsworth, an appellate court refused a trespasser’s
request to overturn Mecom, where the trespasser argued that he had a
duty to prevent drainage of the lessor’s property during the pendency
of the lawsuit over the title.164  The court in Whelan based its decision
to uphold Mecom on the ground that “district courts have ample eq-
uity powers to provide for the development of property pending the
final outcome of litigation, and can exercise those powers when neces-
sary and when called upon to do so.”165  Interestingly, the court’s rea-
soning in Whelan is identical to the court’s reasoning in Mecom.  In
both cases, the court held that a district court’s equitable powers pro-
vide adequate protections to an alleged trespasser—who is later held
to have won title—during the pendency of lititation from subsequent
claims for its failure to produce, to protect against drainage, to de-
velop, or other duties it may hold under an oil and gas lease.  Never-
theless, Whelan was a lawsuit for rescission heard by the court in
equity, while Mecom was a lawsuit at law for trespass.
IV. A CALL TO THE COURTS OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL STATES
The traditional rule, with its subjective focus on the good or bad
faith of the trespasser, promotes two goals. First, it promotes the tradi-
tional goal of tort law: compensation without working a windfall.  Sec-
ond, it promotes the sound goal of restricting punitive damages to
only those cases in which the defendant’s conduct warrants such an
award.166  To that end, the traditional rule ensures that the plaintiff is
fairly compensated for the monetary harm caused by the defendant’s
tortious conduct.
162. Id. at 224.
163. Id.  A commentator contends that this decision “muddies” the waters in Texas
as to whether Mecom’s holding is still good law. However, because the Court in Bran-
non found controlling the timing of the trespass, whether it occurred prior to the filing
of a lawsuit over title, the decision is not at odds with Mecom. To the contrary, it is in
accord with Mecom’s holding.  Houston Prod. Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d 75, 76
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1933) (distinguishing the facts of its case, trespass after a lawsuit
to title was filed, with cases in which the trespass occurred before a lawsuit over title
was filed); see also Mayfield v. de Benavides, 693 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. App. 1985)
(noting Mecom and citing it for rule that one who first trespasses after a lawsuit is
filed is per se a bad-faith trespasser and noting that the converse is not also true).
164. Whelan v. Killingsworth, 537 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana
1976, no writ); see also Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Luckel, 154 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Beaumont 1941, writ refused w.o.m.) (citing Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d at
76).  The Court in Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Luckel denied a party’s request for an
injunction during the pendency of lawsuit over title because there existed an adequate
remedy at law.  In so finding, the Court noted that if the trespasser continued to tres-
pass during the pendency of the appeal over title, they would owe the value of all
production with no offset for their costs to produce. Id.
165. Whelan, 537 S.W.2d at 787.
166. See generally Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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By their nature, oil and gas require substantial expense to remove
and transport. Therefore, for a plaintiff to realize a monetary loss
from the trespass of oil and gas from under its property, he would
need to first spend the same expenses incurred by the defendant.  Es-
sentially, the traditional rule leaves the trespasser as the plaintiff’s
proxy: Unless the trespasser realizes a profit, the plaintiff suffers no
actual monetary damages.167 The traditional rule also avoids a wind-
fall to the plaintiff—the common law abhors windfalls.168  Because the
trespasser improves real property through its trespass, those improve-
ments remain a part of the realty and thus belong to the plaintiff.169
As a result, regardless of whether the trespasser realized a profit, the
plaintiff is still entitled to an award of the wells that trespassed into
the estate.  In addition to the wells, if the plaintiff is also entitled to all
production from those wells, without offset, it would truly work a
windfall.
For the plaintiff to earn a windfall under the above analysis, there is
an assumption that there was a good-faith trespass.  However, if the
trespass was in bad faith, the traditional rule still promotes a just re-
sult.  In the case of a bad-faith trespasser, the rule punishes the tres-
passer by awarding, in addition to the trespassing wells, the gross
proceeds of the trespasser’s production.170  Many courts have com-
pared the measure of damages associated with a bad-faith trespass to
punitive damages, and the comparison is appropriate.171  Punitive
damages aim to punish a defendant’s grossly inappropriate conduct
and to deter others from engaging in similar behavior.172  Accordingly,
167. See generally Champlin Ref. Co. v. Aladdin Petroleum Corp., 238 P.2d 827,
830 (Okla. 1951) (refusing to award costs of drilling a dry hole to the plaintiffs); see,
e.g., Lawrence Oil Corp. v. Metcalfe, 100 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1936).
168. See, e.g., Arthur v. Catour, 803 N.E.2d 647, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting
Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 530 (Ill. 1989) (“[I]t is of course true
that ‘[t]he purpose of compensatory tort damages is to compensate the plaintiff for
[her] injuries, not to punish defendants or bestow a windfall upon plaintiffs.’”)), aff’d,
833 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. 2005).
169. Campbell v. New Haven, 125 A. 650, 651 (Conn. 1924).
170. Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 57–58 (Alaska 1976) (stating the “harsh
rule” for willful trespass “operates as a form of punitive damages, with the goal of
deterrence”).
171. Id.; see also Whitakker v. Otto, 248 Cal. App. 2d 666 (1967); Athens & Pomer-
ory Coal & Land Co. v. Tracy, 153 N.E. 240, 244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1925).
172. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (upholding a jury in-
struction stating punitive damages are “‘not to compensate the plaintiff for any in-
jury’, but ‘to punish the defendant’ and ‘for the added purpose of protecting the
public by [deterring] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the fu-
ture’”); ex rel G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Pa. 1998) (“[T]he primary goals
of punitive damages have been achieved. The tortfeasor has been punished and, pre-
sumably, deterred; he now serves as an example to others in the hope that they too
may be deterred.”); see also Tillett v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Mont. 1996) (hold-
ing punitive damages serve both to punish and to set an example); Ex parte Vulcan
Materials Co., 992 So. 2d 1252, 1274  (Ala. 2008) (stating “[p]unitive damages exist to
accomplish society’s goals of punishing and deterring egregious tortious conduct”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1979) (stating “[t]he purposes of
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in awarding damages based on the state-of-mind of the tortfeasor—
either good faith or bad faith—the traditional rule is in accord with
the common law that permits the award of punitive damages where
the same are justified.173
On the other hand, the non-traditional rule promotes neither of the
goals of the traditional rule.  First, it ignores the goal of tort law to
compensate the plaintiff and in every case works a windfall on the
plaintiff.  Next, it awards the plaintiff punitive damages without con-
sidering the trespasser’s conduct.  The courts that employ the non-
traditional rule apply rigid, objective criteria to determine if a party is
a bad-faith trespasser.
While not directly discussing the traditional rule and thus not con-
trasting it to the rule it ultimately applied, the Court in Pittsburgh
stressed that a trespasser may not rely on a mistake of law to support
his status as a good-faith trespasser. The Court reasoned that a party
may not rely on an error of law because everyone is assumed to know
the law:
Why should one be treated as acting in good faith when dealing with
property as his own, when he knows all of the facts which constitute
his claim, as well as the claim of his adversary, which facts, when
properly construed, give him no title to the land? Such a holding
would make every man a judge of the law in his own case, instead of
being bound by the law as interpreted by those charged with that
duty. We must therefore conclude that the defendants, when they
drilled the wells on these lands, were willful trespassers, just as
much so as though there had been no question but that the plaintiffs
had the superior right. They could not decide the disputed question
in their own favor, and then proceed with the hope that their acts
would be characterized by this court as in good faith, even though
their judgment upon the law of the case should not be approved.174
The Pittsburgh Court’s reasoning echoes a common maxim of the
criminal law that ignorance of the law is no excuse.175  However, that
principle is misplaced when applied to cases regarding a trespass to an
oil and gas estate.  In fact, that principle was directly rejected by at
least one court176 and impliedly rejected by other courts, each of
awarding punitive damages . . . are to punish the person doing the wrongful act and to
discourage him and others from similar conduct in the future”).
173. While justifications may differ slightly between jurisdictions, courts generally
uphold awards of punitive damages where justified. See generally Maley v. Palanuk,
505 P.2d 336, 337 (Or. 1973) (leaving the question of punitive damages to the jury
where justified by the defendant’s state of mind); Sabir v. Jowett, 214 F. Supp. 2d 226
(D. Conn. 2002) (finding that, on a motion for new trial, remittitur will not be justified
if the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages is within the constitutionally accept-
able range).
174. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pentress Gas Co., 100 S.E. 296, 298 (W. Va.
1919).
175. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 194–96, (1998).
176. United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 117 F. 481, 485–86 (8th Cir. 1902).
74 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
which relied upon the traditional rule.177  Those courts hold that any
honest mistake, even one as to the law, is sufficient to make one a
good-faith trespasser.178  In United States v. Homestake Mining Co.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit put it best
when it wrote:
The test to determine whether one was a willful or an innocent tres-
passer is not his violation of the law in the light of the maxim that
every man knows the law, but his honest belief, and his actual inten-
tion at the time he committed the trespass; and neither a justifica-
tion of the acts nor any other complete defense to them is essential
to the proof that he who committed them was not a willful
trespasser.179
The court in Homestake also noted the inescapable reality that in
nearly every trespass the trespasser relies on some mistake of law to
support his status as a good-faith trespasser.180  Essentially, Pittsburgh
created a per se bad-faith standard, the result of which leaves every
defendant a trespasser in bad faith and awards every plaintiff a
windfall.
Moreover, the Pittsburgh rule sanctions every defendant with puni-
tive damages regardless of his level of fault.  Meanwhile, punitive
damages are rarely awarded under the common law since it focuses on
fully compensating parties harmed by the conduct of another.181  The
Oklahoma Supreme Court noted as much in Barnes v. Winona Oil
Co.182  There the Court applied the traditional rule and stressed that a
bad-faith trespasser willfully trespasses.183  The defendant who tres-
passed with actual knowledge that he did not own title to the property
was a bad-faith trespasser.184  Such knowledge is the opposite of good
faith. The Court wrote:
To permit the owner of the land or another lessee to recover from
the person who is in peaceful possession of the land and producing
oil or gas therefrom, the value of the oil at the surface without de-
ducting therefrom the cost of producing would be analogous to per-
mitting the recovery of exemplary damages. The damages
recoverable would be more than compensatory.185
177. See, e.g., Rudy v. Ellis, 236 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky.1951); Sapulpa Petroleum Co.
v. McCray, 277 P. 589, 590 (Okla. 1929); Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear, 84 S.W.2d 452, 457
(Tex. 1935); Crawford v. Forest Oil Co., 57 A. 47 (Pa. 1904); United States v. Wyo-
ming, 331 U.S. 440 (1947).
178. See, e.g., Rudy, 236 S.W.2d at 468; Sapulpa Petroleum, 277 P. at 590; Gulf
Prod. Co, 84 S.W.2d at 457; Crawford, 57 A. at 47; United States v. Wyoming, 331
U.S. at 440.
179. Homestake Mining Co., 117 F. at 486.
180. Id. at 485–86.
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Likewise, the United States Appeals Court for the Eight Circuit,
applying South Dakota law, articulated a succinct explanation for how
the rule distinguishes between a good- and bad-faith trespasser.
There, the court wrote:
[T]he law, in its wisdom, perceives the marked difference in the hei-
nousness of the offenses of those who . . . with actual intention to
rob others of their rights, trespass upon their property, and of those
who trespass by mistake, and with no evil purpose, no actual, willful
intent to commit a wrong; and it declares that the former class shall
pay to their victims the full value of the lumber or the ore they take
at the time they sell or use it, while the latter class shall be relieved
from liability upon restitution of the value of the timber in the trees
or of the value of the ore in the mine.186
Pittsburgh and the non-traditional-rule states do not address a ratio-
nale for permitting a punitive-damage-like recovery absent a showing
that the trespasser’s actions were willful.
Unlike in other states in which the non-traditional rule is employed,
Texas offers a rationale for its award of bad faith damages without a
showing of willful conduct in Mecom.187  There, the Court noted that
when a party knows of a pending lawsuit over title to the property
upon which it wishes to operate for oil and gas, “he cannot be consid-
ered a trespasser in good faith so as to entitle him to recover the cost
of his improvements.”188  As discussed above, the court’s reasoning
relied upon the trespasser’s knowledge that at the time he first tres-
passed litigation was ongoing over the title to the property upon which
he trespassed.189  The Court in Mecom did not hold that knowledge
pre-lawsuit of a claim by another that they had superior title made
one a per se bad-faith trespasser.  In that situation, the trespasser’s
status as a good- or bad-faith trespasser was still measured under the
traditional rule.190  In that respect, Mecom is less rigid than Pittsburgh.
However, Mecom still works a result that cuts against the purpose
of the traditional rule.  As one commentator, critical of Mecom, noted
there is no reason to treat differently a case in which a defendant first
trespasses after a lawsuit is filed.191  That commentator noted:
[T]o hold that any single fact or combination of facts . . . negatives
good faith as a matter of law, ignores the principle upon which relief
is based and, without reason . . . . For it is not unreasonable to be-
lieve that the pervasive justice of equity may discern a deserving
trespasser who honestly and reasonably believes that he had title,
186. United States v. Homestake Minining Co., 117 F. 481, 485–86 (8th Cir. 1902).





191. Morris, supra note 44, at 220–21.
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although he knew of the adverse claim and suit filed to assert it, or
that it may detect and penalize a despicable interloper . . . .192
A party may have a strong and honest conviction that their interest
in title is superior to another who has filed a lawsuit over the same.
Moreover, in cases where the trespasser takes under color of title
through an oil and gas lease, there is an even more compelling need to
provide that trespasser with latitude to err in his judgment on title
even if his first operation on the property occurs after a lawsuit is filed
concnering the property’s title.
The most compelling concern is that, if the court ultimately upholds
the trespasser’s title and the trespasser failed to drill any oil or gas
wells, he runs the risk that his lessor will later sue to invalidate the oil
and gas lease for his failure to produce oil or gas in paying quantities.
In other words, the trespasser runs the risk of winning the battle (his
title is upheld) but losing the war in a subsequent lawsuit with his
lessor over lease termination.
This is especially true in cases like Mecom where the lessee–tres-
passer’s first foray onto the property occurs after a lawsuit was filed.
In those cases, no oil or gas well had been drilled.  Had the trespass
occurred before the lawsuit was filed, there would presumably  be
wells upon the property at issue and thus the lessee–trespasser may
have savings clauses in the lease, or defense at law (such as the doc-
trine of cessation of production), to protect him in a lessor’s subse-
quent lawsuit to invalidate his lease.193  Allowing the lessee–trespasser
to continue the trespass ensures that if he is later found not to have
trespassed—he owns the right to operate from the oil and gas estate—
he will continue to maintain that right after the lawsuit over title as
against any challenge from his lessor.
That traditional rule works no harm to the true owner of the oil and
gas.  If the trespasser does not realize a profit, the plaintiff inherits the
wells without any of the costs to drill.  Likewise, in the case where a
192. Id.
193. A “savings clause” is a provision added into an oil and gas lease extending the
lease beyond the fixed primary term where production is not attained in paying quan-
tities. See Sword v. Rains, 575 F.2d 810, 812–913 (10th Cir. 1978) (extending a lease
under a continuous operations clause even though production was not attained);
Samano v. Sun Oil Co., 621 S.W.2d 580, 580–82 (Tex. 1981) (holding lease terminated
where express savings clause allowed 60-day grace period and production ceased for
seventy-three days).  The temporary cessation of production doctrine protects a lessee
from forfeiting the lease where production in paying quantities ceases “temporarily.”
See Saulsberry v. Siegel, 252 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Ark. 1952) (determining based on the
facts that a four-year cessation due to fire was temporary, allowing the lease to remain
effective); note that the equitable doctrine of repudiation will not apply here.  That
doctrine provides that if a lessor to an oil and gas lease is unsuccessful in a lawsuit
against his lessee to invalidate their oil and gas lease and the lessee has not yet en-
tered the secondary term, the primary term of the lease is tolled for that period of
time during which the lawsuit was ongoing.  Exploracion de la Estrella Soloataria
Incorporacion v. Birdwell, 858 S.W.2d 549, 544 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1993, no pet.).
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profit is realized, the plaintiff earns the wells and whatever profits the
trespasser earned.
V. CONCLUSION
All courts should correctly apply the subjective test to determine a
trespasser’s good or bad-faith status.  Courts wrongly applying an ob-
jective component to the test should cease that application and adopt
the traditional rule.  The subjective standard universally pronounced
by all oil and gas producing jurisdictions should remain subjective and
not be compromised with an objective component.  The subjective ap-
plication of the traditional rule avoids awarding the injured party a
windfall and treats both trespasser and oil or gas owner fairly. Addi-
tionally, it allows the trespasser to deduct his reasonable costs of de-
velopment where the trespasser honestly believed he had the right to
produce the oil or gas from the estate upon which he trespassed.  This
gives the injured party the benefit of production without awarding the
windfall of production costs.  Courts that apply an objective standard
destroy this subjective and fair application of the rule by measuring
the reasonableness of the trespasser’s honest belief.  Such an applica-
tion exposes the good-faith trespasser to unwarranted damages and is
simply an incorrect application of an axiomatic rule.
